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It is gener:ally regarded as a truism that currency devaluation 
is inflationary, except under those circumstances when a devaluation 
would perversely worsen a country's balance on goods arid services. The 
reasoning underlying this proposition is simple and straightforward: a 
successful devaluation will increase export receipts and/or divert 
import demand to domestic substitutes, on both counts adding to the 
total monetary demand in the economy. But increases in aggregate de­
mand reinforced by multiplier effects may be expected, by itself• to 
worsen the current account. It follows that conscious policies of de­
mand deflation must be undertaken if the beneficial effects of devalua­
tion are not to be partially or even wholly eroded through devaluation­
induced increases in total demand. 
This paper challenges the theoretical proposition that successful 
. 1/
devaluation is always,nflationary and sets out conditions under 
which the opposite will be true. 
The Currency of Heasurement 
A devaluing country is typically interested in improving the 
current account of its balance of payments in terms of foreign currency. 
Foreign exchange is the scarce resource, of which supplies to the coun­
try are inadequate. But the impact of a devaluation on the country's 
total money demand must be measured in terms of domestic currency; that 
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is the unit of measurement for domestic output, income, and expendi­
ture and for any gaps between output and expenditure. For many pur­
poses this distinction between foreign and domestic currencies is of 
minor consequence. A current account balanced in one currency will be 
balanced in the other; a deficit eliminated in foreign currency will 
also be eliminated in domestic currency. When the relationship between 
currencies changes, however, the distinction between currencies is of 
considerable importance in a significant class of circumstances, and 
much conventional analysis of devaluation is substantially modified by 
taking it into account. In particular, devaluations that are success­
ful in the sense of improving a country's current account position in 
terms of foreign currency may nonetheless be deflationary in the sense 
of reducing aggregate monetary demand (measured in domestic currency) 
within the devaluing country. This outcome is not merely a theoretical 
possibility; it is a likely one in many less developed countries -
capital-importing countries with rather low elasticities of demand for 
imports. 
The possibility of deflationary devaluation can be seen most s.imply 
by considering the relationship B = rBd, where B = X - Mis the 
balance on goods and services measured in terms of foreign currency, r 
is the foreign-currency price of a unit of domestic currency, and Bd 
is the balance on goods and services measured in terms of domestic 
currency. A devaluation by 6r < 0 will change the balance measured in 
either currency, leading to the relationship: 
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(1) + 
where 6 indicates a change in the variable it precedes. It is clear 
from equation {1) that even when 6B is positive, implying an improve~ 
ment in the foreign balance, 6Bd may be negative, implying a reduction 
in aggregate money demand in the devaluing country, so long as Bd is 
negative, that is, so long as imports exceed exports~- a condition 
usually met in devaluing countries, Most analysis of devaluation has 
neglected this possibility because it assumes that trade is initially 
balanced (B = Bd = O) and/or that the magnitude of the deval4ation is 
"small," so that the quantitative impact of 6r can be neglected. 21 On 
either assumption the second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) 
can be neglected, and the change in the balance must have the same 
sign no matter what the currency of measurement. 
The movement in opposite directions of the balance measured in 
the two currencies arises because the relationship between the curren­
cies has changed, so that the magnitude of the deficit measured in domes­
tic currency will~ as a result of devaluation, before any allowance 
for economic adjustments in response to the devaluation.
is actually deflationary
Whether or not devaluation/depends on the responsiveness of the 
balance on goods and services to changes in relative prices. The more 
responsive the balance to changes in the exchange rate, the less l~kely 
devaluation is to be deflationary. But it will be shown below that 
devalµation can be deflationary even when the conventional Marshall-Lerner 
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conditions are met, i.e., even when the sum of the country's price 
elasticity of demand for imports and the world's price elasticity of 
demand for the country's exports exceeds unity. 
To reduce the task of setting out the conditions under which 
successful devaluation will be deflationary (6B > O; 6Bd < O) to manageable 
proportions, it will be assumed that the price elasticity of supply of 
the devaluing country's imports is infinitely large. Most countries 
are certainly price-takers for their imports, the exceptions being 
mainly confined to the largest countries such as the United States and 
possibly Britain and Germany. 
The formal relationships between devaluation, prices elasticities, 
and the change (in either currency) in the balance of goods and ser­
vices are shown in an appendix. In the case of infinitely elastic supply 
of imports and for a devaluation that is negligibly small, the following 
condition must be met if devaluation is to have !!.Q. effect on the balance 
measured in foreign currency: 6B = kMlXn~(l-e:x) - e:m) = 0 
M(n +e:)
X X 
n (1-e: >J.X. X X · 
or (2) e: =Mn[ +e: m X X 
Here e: is the foreign price elasticity of demand for the country's ex­
x 
ports, n is the country's price elasticity of supply for exports, and 
X 
§m::l.s th~ country's price elasj:ici-ty- of demand for j.mports, al,l defined 
to be non-negative. X/M is the ratio of exports of goods and 
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services to imports of goods and services before the devaluation; this 
ratio is of course insensitive to the currency of measurement. 
k = (6r/r) is the proportional devaluation. 
An analogous condition must be met if devaluation is to have no 
effect on the balance measured in domestic currency (6Bd = O): 





Equations (2) and (3) form two boundaries defining three regions, 
one in which the balance deteriorates in terms of both currencies (the 
conventional case of "perverse" elasticities), one in which the balance 
improves in te nns of ho th currencies , and one in which the balance 
improves in terms of one currency but deteriorates in terms of the 
other. These boundaries are plotted in Figure 1, treating n and X/M
X 
as parameters. 
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that there may be a substantial range 
of values for the two demand elasticities for which a successful devaluation 
(~B > 0) may nonetheless be deflationary. This outcome cannot occur if 
Em> 1, but it can occur for values of ex greater than unity. 
If X/M = 1, that is if trade is initially balanced, then 
equations (2) and (3) are identical, the two boundaries coincide, and 
the demand-elasticity field is divided into only two regions. The
,values of)
curvature of the two boundaries is the same f ~<--i, and is de­x 
termined by the supply elasticity for exports, n • If this is in-
~ X






















ment and under-utilized capacity, then the boundaries become straight 
lines and the terminal point of the upper boundary (t.Bd = 0) on the 
e: 
X 
- axis is 11/X. In this case if X/H = 1 the boundaries coincide in the 
conventional Marshall-Lerner condition for no change in the balance, 
e: + e: = 1, shown as a dotted line in Fig. 1. Thus there is a sub-x m 
stantial sub-region in which this condition is met and devaluation is 
nonetheless deflationary. Smaller·supply elasticities result in greater 
curvature toward the origin, and in the limiting case of n = 0 result in
X 
the two regions shown in Fig. 2. In this case devaluation will always 
improve the foreign balance (provided e:m 4 O), but it will also always 
be deflationary if e: is smaller than 1-(X/M), regardless of the valuem 
of e: •
X 
It is important to note at this point the nature of these elastici-
ties, and particularly of the elasticity of demand for imports, e: •
m 
These should be regarded as quasi-~ post elasticities rather than 
as elasticities describing the underlying demand conditions. Many 
less developed countries restrict imports severely through quotas 
and exchange controls; these controls typically ensure a low value 
of e:m. In these circumstances devaluation may be deflationary even 
when the elasticity of demand for exports is quite high. The 
elasticities are only "quasi" because these M post elasticities 
should not encompass the impact on imports arising from changes in 
the level of total demand. 
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Moreover, there is an important element of timing. Price re­
sponsiveness, both of supply and of demand, is likely to be higher 
after economic units have had time to adjust to the new situation. The 
supply of exports may be quite inelastic in the short run•but will be­
come more responsive with the passage of time. If the elasticity of 
demand for imports is also low, devaluation by a country in deficit may 
be expected to be deflationary in the short run, as indicated in Fig. 2. 
With the passage of time, the boundaries of the middle zone will shift 
northeastward as supply responds increasingly to the new opportunities. 
As this occurs, the values for£ consistent with deflation also increase. m 
The values of£ consistent with dfl.flation decline, but may remain quiteX 
high (compare Fig. 1 with Fig. 2). 
Discrete Devaluations 
The foregoing analysis has assumed that the devaluation is 
sufficiently small that its magnitude can be neglected in the analysis. 
Yet in the "adjustable peg" regime of fixed exchange rates prevailing 
in most of the world most of the time this assumption possibly intro­
duces important error, since devaluations are usually non-negligible 
in amount, typically ranging from 10 to 40 percent. In fact, however, 
allowance for discrete devaluation does not require substantial modifi­
cation of the above results except for very large devaluations. 
The analogues to equations (2) and (3) become quite complex 
when the effects of a discrete devaluation are taken into account (see 
the Appendix); certain terms normally neglected must be included, 
and of course the results depend on the size of the devaluation itself. 
Figures 3 and 4 sketch out boundaries defined by llB = C and llEd = I)' divid-
ing: the field into three (or two) regions, as before. Fere 1· and··'- E are 
m 
measured along the axes, and E and X/M are treated as para.--ne te rs • Figure 3
X 
00is drawn for Tix = and Fig. 4 for Tix = 0, the tuo extrerr1e conditions 
with regard to export supply. The rightmost terminal points on the 
boundaries in Fig. 3 terminate on the boundary lines of Fig. 1 (Fig. 3 
has been drawn for £x = ().5), where the magnitude of the devaluation is 
negligibly small. The three elemel'l.ts E , E , and k form B. three-dimen­x m 
sional region which can be in1agined by putting the k-axis perpendicular 




plane) in Fig. 1, and Fir,. 3 represents one 
cross-section of that region. 
It can be seen in Fig. 3 that the region of deflationary devaluation 
narrows as the magnitude of the devaluation increases, but it remains 
substantial except for very large devaluations. For values of E > .5,
X 
however, the middle regions first increases its vertical dimension as tne 
devaluation gets larger, then subsequently decreases. Thus in· this case 
a discrete devaluation runs a somewhat larger chance of being detiationary 
than is evident from Fig. 1. 
Fig. 4 shows the opposite extreme case w"flere exports are completely 
inelastic in supply, adding a third dimension,k, to Fig. 2. Here the 
region of deflationary devaluation is obviously insensitive to the 
elasticity of demand for exports. P.s already noted, in this case devalua­










Tl = 0 
€X m 
1.0 
b.B > 0 
6.B > 0
•' 
LIBd < 0 
k-L=----------­-1.0 
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Figure 3 brings out the fact that a sufficiently large devaluation 
will aluays improve the trade balance (within the framework of this 
static analysis), regardless of the size of the demand elasticities (so 
long as e:m > 0) ~ even when export supply is elastic. Thus the "stability 
conditions'' so frequently discussed in the literature on exchange rates 
are not applicable to discrete changes in exchange rates~ certain. effects 
that grow with the magnitude of the devaluation and eventually assure an 
improvement in the balance are normally neglected. In particular, for a 
given (discrete) devaluation, the percentage decline in export prices 
(leading to loss of foreign earnings if e:x < 1) will be smaller than the 
percentage increase in domestic prices of imported goods (leading to a 
fall in demand for imports), and this discrepancy will grow with the size 
of the devaluation. This effect pointing toward improvement is reinforced 
if X < M, since the decline in export earnings applies to a smaller base 
than the decline in import volume).! 
Deflation Reinforces Devaluation 
One general conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that 
devaluation-induced changes in aggregate demand 9 far from undoing the 
effects of devaluation on the trade balance, actually in certain cases 
~an be expected to reinforce the effects of devalu~tion on the balance. 1 t 
is generally assumed that the effects of devaluation will be weakened or 
even eliminated if aggregate money demand is permitted to respond to the 
price effects of devaluation. This was the major point of ·the "absorption 
approach" to devaluation. But if devaluation worsens the balance in terms 
of domestic currency, the level of income and expenditure will be depressed 
and that will contribute toward a furtherimprovement in the balance. 
In the "Keynesian" case of infinitely elastic supply for both imports 
and exports, and where no government action is 
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taken to compensate for ti:1e changes in income (hut monetary action is takeri. 
to neutralize any monetary effects of the current account deficit), the 
ultimate effect of devaluation on the balance on goods anc:1 services (61'.*) 
trl.11 be~ 
(4) 6B* = 6B - (r + 6r) .J!!._ 6Bds+m 
where m is the marginal propensity to import out of additional income, s is 
the marginal propensity not to spend out of additional income, and foreign 
repercussions are ignored. Clearly if 6Ed < O, the '·final1' improvement in 
the balance will exceed the 11initial" improvement. This contrasts w1 th the 
. s 
more usual formulation under these assumptions, 6B* =[ + ] 6R, where s m 
the final improvement (after allowing for income effects) is clearly less 
than the initial improvement, and possibly substantially less. This con­
ventional expression is in error even when devaluation is expansionary, 
since as we have seen 6Bd cannot be equated with 6B. 
A second general conclusion to be dralm from the analysis is that 
devaluation, even successful devaluation, may generate unemploy.ment and 
under-utilization of capacity and hence without corrective policy may lead 
to a waste of resources. This will occur if devaluation results in in­
creased expenditures (in domestic currency) on imported goods, diverting 
domestic expenditure away from domestically-produced goods and services, and 
if the increased foreign expenditure for the country's exports fails to 
compensate fully for the reduction in domestic purchases. Under these 
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circumstances the economic authorities may rightly choose to expand total 
domestic expenditure, contrary to the advice usually given, and they can 
do so without weakening the 11initial" effects of devaluation on the 
balance (6B). Such expansion cannot go very far, however, for the de­
valuation-induced deflation is limited, and for moderate devaluations 
will always be less than the initial imbalance, measured in domestic 
5/currency.-
Capital-Exporting Countries 
Thus far the analysis has been couched in terms of a country with 
a continuing deficit on goods and services, as would be characteristic 
of a country with a normal import of capital. A simi~r analysis 
applies to a normal capital-exporting country, a country for which 
X/M > 1. In this case again there are three possible outcomes rather 
than the two conventionally considered; hut here the middle region 
analogous to that in Fig. 1 involved a deterioration in the balance in terms 
of foreign currency and an improvement in terms of domestic currency. 




= 1.0, lies 
wholly above the boundary 6Bd = O. A devaluing country falling into 
the middle region here will find its trade position worsened by the 
devaluation in the first instance, and the devaluation-induced domestic 
expansion will tend to worsen the position even further. This perhaps 
offers one analytical reason, although undoubtedly not the most impor­
tant one, why developed (capital-exporting) countries are more 
reluctant to devalue their currencies when in balance-of-payments 
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difficulty than is true of the less developed (capital-importing) coun­
tries. Unless the demand elasticities are markedly higher (as they pro­
bably are, however), the prospects for successful devaluation are less 
good. 
Actual Values of the Paran1eters 
Real Horld relevance is given to the analysis presented here by 
the fact that many countries do in fact have substantial and continuing de­
ficits in their trade in goods and services. In 1965 no fewer than 19 
countries~ listed in Table 1, had a ratio of exports to imports of goods 
and services less than J.3. (Only three countries, the United States, 
Uruguay, and Saudi Arahia, had X/"''i in excess of 1.25 \ and that for Uruguay 
was aberrant.) These ratios suggest that the middle region of Fig. 1 
(which is dratm for X/M = 0 .6) could in fact be an important one. 
Data on demand and supply elasticities are much more difficult 
to obtain. As noted above, however, the elasticity of supply of exports 
and the elasticity of demand for imports are both likely to be small in 
the period immediately following a devaluation, although they may be ex­
pected to increase vith time. Thus the timing of collateral measures will 
be very important. Secondly, the import demand elasticities in many less 
developed countries are held down both by the composition of those coun­
tries' imports (oriented heavily to raw materialsj capital goods, and in 
some cases foodstuffs) and by import policies that do not permit changes 
in relative prices to express themselves fully in changing the demand 
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Table 1 
Ratio of Exports to Imports, 10':,S 
(Goods and Services) 
f>outh Vietnam .46 Somalia .70
Tunisia .52 Indiaa .71
Pakistan .52 Sierra Leone .72
Israel .5 7 Spain .74
Jordan .SB Indonesiaa .76 
South Korea .5') Nigeria .76
Ghana .62 Bolivia •76 
Greece .65 United AraL T>.epublic • 79 
Costa Hica .66 Dominican Republic •79 
Haiti .68 
a 196li 
Source: ldF, Balance of Payments Yearbook 
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for imports. If imports are already rationed through quotas or exchange 
licensing, raising the domes tic price of imports may well have 1ittle 
or no effect on the quantity imported, yet it will reduce purchasing 
power in the hands of the public. 11oreover, if devaluation is accompanied 
by some liberalization of the import restrictions, t;e value of imports 
in forei?,n currency might actually increase. Analytically, the pre­
devaluation ratio X/M can be regarded as having been lowered• and the middle 
region of Fig. 1 is thereby increased in size. Devaluation under these 
circumstances is even more lH:ely to be deflationary. 
Summary 
In a range of circumstances likely to be commonly found in many 
less developed countries, successful devaluation will be deflationary 
rather than inflationary, as is usually supposed. Devaluation will of 
course increase the domestic prices of imports and import-competing 
goods; it is precisely this price increase that is deflationary, since 
higher money payments for imports withdraw purchasing power and reduce 
expenditures on domestic goods. The outcome is very much analogous to 
that created by a rise in excise taxes, which raises prices but also 
reduces excess demand and is deflationary in that relevant sense. 
When these circumstances are met, further deflation through mone­
tary and fiscal policies, usually said to be necessary to make devaluation 
work, may be both unnecessary and inappropriate. Indeed, there may even 
be occasions on which expansionary policies might accompany devaluation, 
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in order to avoid unnecessary waste of resources, although in no case 
would such expansion be very large. If deflation is desired on domes­
tic grounds, the devaluation will also contribute tmrnrd that end~ and 
the resulting deflation will augment the price-switching effects of de­
valuation on the trade balance. 
Al though the analysis leading to this conclusion is conventional, 
it has several limitations. First 1 it makes no allouance for the effect 
of devaluation on international capital movements, although unlike the 
more usual analysis it presupuoses continuing capital inflows (or outflows). 
Purely speculative reversals in capital flows have little or no effect 
on the analysis. If, however, the devaluing country becomes a more 
attractive place for location of industry because of the devaluation, this 
may generate some foreign capital expenditure there that would not 
otherwise have taken place. 
Second, the analysis here has ignored the effect of changes on 
the tenns of trade on aggregate spending (the Laursen-Tletzler effect). 
For all but the smallest countries, successful devaluation may be ex-
pected to worsen the terms of trade on the assumptions made here, and this 
will reduce real incomes in the devaluing country• with a resul tin3 reduction 
in saving. This effect will be somewhatinflationary; but it can normally 
6/be neglected.-
Finally, the analysis has been static, ignoring e~tirely dynamic 
interactions running from a devaluation-induced rise in. the cost-of-­
living to Hages and back again. 
Aooendix 
For a change in exchange rate /:;_r ~ the ha.lance on goods and services 
measured in _!oreign curnmcy (:':1) may be expccte<l to change by~ 
Y n (1-e: )
(A.1) 6B = leF -!. X X _ e:r/ l+n111 ) Jl•. [ '-I n +e: 
X X n +e: 
111 El 
The balance f'.teasured it! domeotic currency (Bd) will change by 
e: (l+n ) n (1-e: )JX X m m •(A.2) +e: +n n +e:
X X m rn 
where e: = price elasticity of demand for importsm 
e: = price elasticity of foreign demand for the country's exportsX 
nm= price elasticity of foreign supply of imports 
nx = price elasticity of supply of exports 
X = initial level of exports of goods and services 
M = initial level of imports of goods and services (subscript 
d indicates measurement in domestic currency) 
k = Lirj = the proportionate change in exchange rater 
Setting (A.1) and (A.2) equal to zero, specifying 
rearranging terms yields equations (2) and (3) in the text. 
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Expression (A.2) was first derived by Joan Robinson [11), and the 
derivation of both expressions can be found in Alexander [1]. Both of 
these authors, however, derived the above expressions by neglecting certain 
interaction terms, a procedure that is justifiable only if k is negligibly 
small and if interest in the analysis is focussed on stability in the 
exchange market. 
For discrete devaluations of non-negligible amount, however, the 
interaction terms cannot be safely neglected. Unfortunately, including 
them explicitly involves complex expressions in fractional orders of k 
and the elasticities. Some idea of the:influence of these terms can be 
gained, however, by considering the two analytically simple cases n = 00 
X 
and nx = O, both for n = oa as before. For these cases(shotm as Figures 3m , 










It should be noted that the demand elasticities in (A.3) - (A.6) are 
quasi-expost elasticities, and they may therefore vary with the size of 
the devaluation. The elasticities have been somewhat arbitrarily defined 
here so as to have the desirable property that E: = 1 will leave total 
X 
foreign exchange receipts from exports unchanged and£ = 1 will leave 
m 
total domestic currency payments for imports unchanged; thus, 
l\Q q+/J. q 
e:x = - Q . (-q-) and i:: -- ( /J.P ) --2._ m - P + 6P 6p 
where Q is the quantity of exports and q its price in foreign currency and 
Pis the quantity of imports and pits price in domestic currency. These 
definitions differ slightly from those normally used for arc elasticities, 
but the major conclusions from the analysis are not sensitive to this 
alteration. 
Equations (A.3) and (A.5) indicate why~ level of devaluation 
will always succeed in improving the current balance, regardless of the 
values of the demand elasticities (provided£ > O): so long as there is m 
some price sensitivity to the demand for imports, a sufficiently large 
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devaluation will lead to a fall in import volume that more than compensates 
£or the loss of export receipts since export receipts "i,1ill decline by9 
kX{l-E· ) and import volume (o: payments~ since foreign prices are assumedX 
E 
constant) will fall by kiJ1+ilc1-e: ) • For k < 0~ 0 k (the proportionate fall 
... k m 
in export prices) < --- (the proportionate rise in import prices)., "sol+k 
for sufficiently large k the reduction in imports will outweigh any reduction 





1/ Changes in the distribution of income arising from devaluation, 
and the effects of these distributional changes on savings and 
imports, including the possibility of deflation, have been 
recognized. See Diaz [3). 
J:./ See the classic analysis by Joan Robinson {11]. Also Alexander [lJ, 
Fleming [5], Lausen and i1etzler [10), and Tsiang [12). An ex­
ception is Hirscmnann [8], who early pointed out the possibility 
that a change in the balance measured in domestic currency might 
have the opposite sign from the change in the balance measured in 
foreign currency, and therefore that successful devaluationmight 
be deflationary both in the devaluing country and in the rest of 
the world. Haberler [6] and Harberger [7] also state clearly 
that the two balances may move in opposite directions, but they 
carry the analysis no further. Day [4) is concerned with the size 
of the devaluation required to eliminate an initial trade im­
balance~ and of course a deficit eliminated in one currency will 
also be eliminated in the other. 
1/ It should be remembered that the elasticities used here are quasi­
ex post elasticities, and that they therefore take on values appro­
priate to the devaluation in question. These need not be the same 
as the elasticities evaluated for small changes in relative prices 
around the pre-devaluation position. 
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!!._/ See Alexander (1), Black (2), Tsiang [12]. 
?) This follows directly from (1): for successful devaluation 
(6B > 0) of less than 50 percent (6r/r > -.5), 
This may not be negligible, however. For a country tJhere imports 
amount to 20 percent of GNP and exports are only 60 percent as 
50 percent
high as imports, the deflationary impact of a successful/devaluation 
might be nearly 8 percent of GNP. 
§_/ Jones' (9] argument that this effect will in any case be only 
transitory, on the empirical grounds that the long-run marginal 
propensity to save is equal to the average propensity to save, 
is perhaps less applicable to less developed countries. 
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